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1. Introduction 
The issue of illegal immigration receives considerable attention from governments all 
over the world.  The policy makers and the academia alike devote substantial interest in the 
subject owing to various socio-political and economic bearings on the recipient and the source 
countries.  Defined broadly, illegal immigration constitutes a move from one country to another 
by ways and means not admissible under the general or country-specific legal requirements that 
„regular‟ migrants need to satisfy.  In some cases, however, overstaying by legal migrants turns 
them into illegal migrants and extends the definition of „irregular migration‟.  However, not all 
developed countries are exposed to illegal immigration of serious magnitude.  Statistically 
speaking, the United States is undoubtedly the single largest recipient of illegal immigrants; 
Mexico being the largest source country.  The official statistics of the US Homeland Security 
Department states that there has been entry of an estimated 11.5 million people in USA in the 
year 2011 alone. When such statistics is reviewed globally by inclusion of a number of 
destination countries in Europe and Asia-Pacific (mainly Australia), the numbers are 
overwhelming.  Not surprisingly, therefore, the staggering volume of illegal immigration has 
motivated many influential studies in economics, political science, sociology and international 
law.  These contributions are steadily growing and it may be useful to take a stock of the 
available issues in order to highlight some of the important policy implications emanating from 
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these studies. To this end, we mainly offer a brief review of the literature on the economics of 
illegal migration with anecdotal reference to sociological and legal scholarship.  As a caveat, we 
must also mention that even for the economics literature our purpose is not to offer a census of 
all studies, but review a few interesting results and policies.   
Before we proceed to further details, let us invoke a more recent concern about the 
categorization of illegal immigration into two possible strands dominating the current modus 
operandi.  These are, namely, „smuggling‟ and „trafficking‟ of illegal workers mainly from poor 
to rich countries and we shall devote special attention to this distinction in later sections.  Note 
that, albeit movement of workers across various countries have always been a matter of concern, 
but the magnanimity of what is now deemed as a severe problem is consequent on the impact of 
illegal movements spilling over to the economic, social and political lives of the legal residents at 
the destination and source countries. It came under the political and economic scanners of 
national governments and policymakers especially in countries that have historically relied on 
migrant workforce and continued to be migrant heaven even thirty years back. Much of the 
current impact assessments, therefore, treat illegal immigration as a host country problem.   
As a result, policies to restrict illegal immigration have been primarily driven by the 
political and economic judgments at the destination capturing only a partial demand side view of 
the problem.  One has to nevertheless appreciate the fact that since illegal immigration is 
principally governed by the conditions of excess supply of relatively unskilled workers, the 
socio-economic factors at the source must also be reviewed at length. In other words, unless 
sufficient attention is devoted to crucial incentives and disincentives governing decisions to 
migrate illegally from the source countries, many restrictive policies designed at the destinations 
are not likely to yield adequate results or lessen the degree of exploitation that is intrinsic to 
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illegal labor mobility.  Moreover, an attempt to understand the supply side of the problem is also 
important in light of the fact that the richer destinations find it increasingly challenging to 
monitor and control illegal entries despite elaborate mechanisms in place (viz. Bandopadhyay 
and Bandyopadhyay, 1998). As part of casual observations it is agreed that illegal immigration as 
well as overstaying has increased as legalized access to the richer countries have steadily 
dwindled over time.  Even with the Mode 4 type of arrangements under the GATS, which 
facilitates entry of manufacturing and construction workers in richer countries, a potential 
applicant is required to satisfy several stringent criteria to qualify as a legal migrant.  Besides, 
many of these schemes typically operate on a favoured nation basis and are far from transparent. 
This is regularly discussed in the media (BBC, 2008; CNN, 2008, for example) and considered 
as an important factor that positively affects the scale of illegal immigration.  Notwithstanding 
such temporary shocks generated by global business cycles and policies, various reports of the 
United Nations estimate the number of illegal entries at 4 million every year.  This, as we have 
alluded earlier, constitutes both smuggled and trafficked workers. In this regard, the United 
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) states that smuggling of workers is the fastest 
growing activity in the world with profit currently estimated at $31.6 billion.       
 The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 broadly explores the 
economics of illegal immigration, where theory and examples relevant to the North American 
immigration problem feature as dominant sources of information.  Section 3 discusses the 
economics of smuggling vis-à-vis trafficking and looks into the source country perspectives in 
detail.  The fourth section deals with some socio-political impacts of smuggling and trafficking 
and section 5 concludes. 
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2. The Economics of Illegal Migration 
Since 1990s the US immigration policies have focused on border enforcement rather than 
other forms of interior controls, especially on the US-Mexican borders despite the fact it has so 
far not been very successful in deterring illegal entries.1  In the year 1997 the INS (currently, US 
Citizenship and Immigration Service) had developed a surveillance system in the form of 
Integrated Surveillance and Intelligence System (ISIS), which failed on many counts despite 
incurring huge costs on behalf of the US government (Koslowski, 2011). It is well-known that 
the dominant policy choices in the host country are restricted to border controls and/or internal 
monitoring. The trade-off between the two has been first discussed in Ethier (1986).  It suggests 
that a policy mix of border enforcement and internal worksite monitoring affects the illegal wage 
and the capture rate of illegal entrants in a complex manner.  When the border enforcement 
(expressed in terms of resources devoted to this activity) is zero but the domestic enforcement 
(expressed in terms of the domestic output spent for this purpose) is at its maximum, the wage 
received by an illegal worker is equal to that they receive at home (being captured with a higher 
probability and deported).  On the other hand, if the domestic enforcement is zero and all 
resource is spent on border enforcement, then those illegal workers who manage to cross the 
border earn as much as the legal unskilled workers at destination (assuming imperfect 
identification of legal and illegal workers by employers).  The substitution between border 
enforcement and domestic enforcement yields a strictly convex to the origin relationship and 
raises the illegal wage as the country moves towards zero domestic enforcement.  The task 
before a social planner is to obtain a combination of the two policies, such that the total cost of 
enforcement is minimized, the national welfare maximized and the policy target of a certain level 
                                                     
1It is recently reported, however, that the illegal Mexican entry into USA has dropped 16 percent in 2008 due to 
deployment of 3000 more border patrol and the tightening job market in construction and services (CNN, 2008).    
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of unskilled legal wage is achieved.  According to this paper, if employer penalty for hiring 
illegal workers turns out to be a real social cost (lost output), then the optimal combination of the 
policies is at point C (figure 1 from Ethier, 1986, p.64). The policy duo offers a convex 
combination denoted by the curve AB and the slope of this curve at minus unity is the optimal 
choice (figure 1).  As the policymaker chooses more border enforcement, the ratio of actual 
entries to potential attempts would fall, but so would detection at work.  The illegal wage rises in 
the southeast direction.  Movement towards the optimal point lowers net policy cost and 
improves ex post welfare of immigrants, but further movement in the southeast direction 
substitutes native welfare for illegal workers‟ welfare. Overall, the policy mix is effective in 
separating two distinct goals of income distribution and controlling of the volume of migration. 
               Domestic Enforcement 
 A 
 
 C 
  Border Enforcement 
                                                                                  B 
Figure 1. Optimal choice between domestic and border enforcements 
These findings influenced research on various dynamic implications associated with 
comparable policies aimed at controlling illegal immigration.  Border enforcement, worksite 
inspection and prohibition of employment of illegal workers all increase the entry cost for illegal 
workers. A large portion of the literature discusses how heightened border enforcement interacts 
with border crossing services – popularly called „coyote‟ crossing in the US.  Djajic (1999) used 
a simple dynamic framework of international and inter-sectoral migration of illegal workers to 
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argue that tougher employer sanctions, intensive identity checks, apprehensions and deportations 
help in lowering the stock of illegal immigrants only if their presence is limited to one 
geographic location and one economic activity. As tougher border controls raise the cost of 
illegal entry, illegal immigrants start investing in anti-detection efforts more.  If the second effect 
dominates the first, the policy may have an adverse effect raising the stock of illegal immigrants. 
Compared to this, employer sanctions are more effective in the sense that they reduce the 
flow of illegal immigrants by lowering their wages. Note that, an enhancement of identity 
checks, apprehensions and deportations might become ineffective if the demand for agricultural 
labor is inelastic by nature. It has often been observed that illegal immigrants might venture into 
newer geographic locations through support networks in an attempt to evade detection by 
authorities. The study clearly suggests that deeper research into the networking abilities of illegal 
immigrants is required in order to suggest policies, which are complementary in nature and are 
capable of dealing with the ability of immigrants to pervade into areas that are less prone to 
detection by authorities. 
Guzman, Haslag and Orrenius (2007) offer several conditions wherein the response of 
tighter border enforcement is countered by greater time investments in border crossing. 
However, if the „smugglers‟ are more efficient and use capital-intensive techniques, less time is 
spent on border-crossing attempts.  This in turn raises the return from illegal migration and more 
workers choose to migrate illegally.  In fact, many other possibilities exist, whereby the capital 
stock and saving propensity interact with the incentives to migrate illegally.  Evaluation of the 
role of border enforcement vis-à-vis employer interdiction suggests that developed countries are 
unlikely to choose low border enforcement compared to no enforcement.  Similarly, Woodland 
and Yoshida (2006) have discussed the connection between factor mobility and illegal 
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immigration when illegal workers display risk aversion.  What do these and similar policy 
propositions therefore imply for welfare of the natives at destination?   
 
Impact at Destination 
The raging debate about illegal immigration and the distribution of wealth and economic 
development in sovereign countries is in stark contrast to the fact that people moved about quite 
freely even a century earlier.2  However, the word „passport‟ had come into existence at least by 
the sixteenth century when William Shakespeare uses it in Henry V (1599).  But, there could not 
have been as much restriction on where individuals would want to settle as long as it did not 
disturb the fair shares of the dominant groups and did not amount to landnahme (land-taking) by 
invaders.3 The large intra-Europe migration clearly distinguished the Antiquity from the Middle 
Ages and spilled further on to the Medieval and Early Modern periods in Europe where Viking, 
Germanic, Slavic, Turkic, Avars, Bulgars, Angles and Saxons moved about the entire continent.  
Modern day migration is characteristically different from Medieval and Early Modern migration 
in the sense that people do not move about in considerably large groups any longer.  Decision to 
migrate is purely individualistic, albeit in some cases migrants use the social capital of groups in 
order to choose appropriate destinations and lower the cost of relocation. In contrast, illegal 
immigration is characterized by movements in groups (although, smaller) and therefore 
reminiscent of historical migration patterns.               
The economic, social and political impact of illegal immigration at the destination is 
looked at from various angles.  First and foremost, many studies discuss implications of illegal 
immigration for the native job market via a number of questions, such as: (1) are the immigrants 
                                                     
2
 The only Indian to have arrived in USA in the year 1850, landed in Texas; US Bureau of Statistics. 
3
 These included conquest of Pannonia by Hungarians, Indo-Aryan conquest, Franks arriving in Francia, Seljuk 
invasion of Anatolia, Gaels coming to Ireland, Anglo-Saxon settlements in Britain etc.       
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competing with native workers for the same jobs? (2) How are wages determined for illegal 
workers?  (3) Is there job market segmentation in effect? Most answers are critically linked to the 
illegal arrangements within the recipient countries and influenced by the mode that the illegal 
immigrants use for entry, whether smuggled in or trafficked.  Generally, private firms or farms 
would always be inclined to hire workers willing to work for the lowest admissible wages.  If the 
level of productivity at the lower rungs of the job ladder (where most of the illegal immigrants 
find jobs, see Djajic, 1997) is not dependent on the legal status of a worker, firms are essentially 
indifferent between hiring a legal and an illegal worker. But, there are always legal and 
institutional restrictions on hiring illegal workers manifested in the form of penalties, revoking of 
license or legal sanctions on the errant firms, subsequently creating the segmentation between 
legal and illegal labor markets. The wages and conditions of work in each market are direct 
products of such segmentation.  Carter (1999) suggests that the effects of illegal immigration 
may both benefit and hurt unskilled workers owing to targeting of primary sector jobs.  When 
illegal immigration is low, availability of primary sector jobs is high and is shared by natives and 
illegal immigrants.  However, as more illegal workers enter, more and more natives are displaced 
from primary jobs leading to Pareto-superior policy propositions in favor of apprehending and 
deporting illegal workers from the primary sector.   
This hardly means, however, that the demand for illegal workers is zero.  First, the act of 
monitoring firms is costly and requires political consensus in a democracy.  And democracies 
such as USA, according to Bhagwati (1987, p. 32), “with their strong civil-libertarian and civil 
lobbies, are not in a position to start shooting happily at the illegal migrants”.4  The alternative 
therefore is to „reason‟ with the firms not to hire illegal workers, in the same spirit as many 
                                                     
4
 Originally published as Bhagwati, J. N (1979), International factor movements and national advantage, 9 th 
Ramaswami Lecture, Indian Economic Review 14, 73-100. 
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developing country governments now campaign against hiring of child labor given the official 
ban on such employment.  Undoubtedly, it leaves enough space for the firms to flout norms with 
a probability attached to being apprehended on the act and pay a penalty. If the firms mange to 
evade apprehension, they retain considerable rent generated by illegal immigration.   
Note that, unwittingly enough, policies adopted by a country to curb illegal inflows often 
produce perverse outcomes for the legal labor market.  The allure of amnesty (Karlson and Katz, 
2003) and a not-so-perfect border control leads to self-selection among illegal workers regarding 
who should migrate.  It turns out that a positive probability of amnesty offered at the destination 
may attract better ability workers who will accept lower pays initially given the option to 
relocate to a higher paying job once the amnesty is granted.  The low ability illegal workers on 
the other hand would not find (low) wage offers negotiable over time and will have little outside 
options given their skill – in addition to the looming threat of information leakage from the 
employing firms to the enforcement authorities.  This would constitute a source of persistent 
exploitation of illegal workers as one observes from numerous sweatshop stories.  It is further 
argued that unlike high ability counterparts, the low ability illegal immigrants become a burden 
to the host economy by consuming publicly supplied goods and services without paying taxes.  A 
mix of amnesty and enforcement applicable to the illegal workers are likely to address the 
inherent tension between these options, in the same spirit as the trade-off discussed in Ethier 
(1986).  
In this connection, Thum (2004) considers how the public expenditures may indirectly 
turn into an instrument of migration control given that in some cases free mobility of labor may 
be difficult to impede, as currently true for the unified labor market in the European Union.  
Enactment of discriminatory practices with regard to public expenditure may be a viable policy 
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when more direct practices such as charging higher taxes or excluding foreigners from public 
services are legally infeasible. More specifically, the government at the destination may 
predominantly provide those goods that benefit natives more than foreigners assuming that there 
is sufficient heterogeneity in language, culture and the consumption baskets between natives and 
immigrants. Since immigrants (in this case legal, but equally applicable to illegal workers) are 
often only temporary guest workers, it should not be difficult for a government to isolate 
expenditure categories along preference patterns. For example, it is straightforward that irregular 
migrants are less likely to visit theatres, use little services from public libraries or consume long 
hours of public broadcasting services.  However, if there are widespread social safety nets, 
recreational facilities or public transport infrastructure, then immigrants cannot be fully excluded 
from these services, unless a law as the one recently adopted in Arizona comes into effect.  It is 
argued that this law would potentially bring back the problems associated with racial profiling of 
immigrants in the US. According to this state law, all individuals must always carry identity 
proofs so that citizens could be distinguished from aliens.  This is unusual for a country that did 
not use iron curtains for immigrants historically – legal and illegal. The proponents argue that 
this is a policy to achieve „attrition through enforcement‟ in the number of illegal entries.  In 
order to bypass this law, large number of immigrants of Hispanic origin has consequently moved 
over to New Mexico, the neighbouring state.  Nonetheless, this is reminiscent of the infamous 
segregation policies prevalent in the United States for a very long time and the threats facing 
Blacks, Hispanics and other non-White immigrants in the form of political acceptability of the 
Ku Klux Klan (see, Levitt and Dubner, 2009).       
In other words, given the decision to migrate at all, the location choice is seriously 
influenced by public expenditure and enforcement characteristics in effect.  In fact, Borjas 
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(1999) shows that due to this differential location choice U.S. states with higher social transfers 
still become the welfare magnets for immigrants.  These results, general for the immigrant 
population as a whole, are premised on the fact that immigrants do not have voting rights.  Mayr 
(2007) derived conditions that if legal unskilled immigrants could vote then the tax rates could 
end up being too low hurting redistribution for all.  Thus, out of pure re-distributive concerns 
alone the natives could vote against inflow of unskilled immigrants.  This result does not 
entertain the possibility that such endogenous choices could exacerbate the problem of illegal 
unskilled immigration.  These choices offer a basket of second-best options.      
The ex post theory of Epstein and Weiss (2000) that ex ante illegal immigrants are 
undesirable, is however, much less myopic.  Since border patrol and internal monitoring both 
consume too much resource, it is not economically efficient to completely stem illegal inflow 
(also impossible in view of long and porous borders between USA and Mexico, in the same way 
as India and South Africa from time to time are exposed to illegal infiltration from politically 
unstable and economically underdeveloped neighboring countries).  It is also possible that illegal 
immigration turns out to be an endogenous policy choice at the destination, wherein the illegal 
workers are deployed in sector-specific activities despite initial rejection of such migration 
policies by the median voter (Hillman and Weiss, 1999).  This reminds of the Ramaswami 
(1968) and Bhagwati (1979) propositions where it is ideal for a rich country, such as the US to 
allow all potential workers to move in from a poor country, like Mexico, and thereby marginal 
product of workers (and wage) lower at home.           
The debate nonetheless continues in terms of the relationship between illegal 
immigration, minimum wages and migration policies (see Vogel, 2000 for similarities between 
the US and German policies; Gaytan-Fergoso and Lahiri, 2000 for the relationship between 
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foreign aid and illegal immigration, etc).  Generally, the willingness to work for low wages 
encourages owners of capital to employ illegal immigrants. This happens when the wages 
demanded are lower than the mandated minimum wage.  However, when the employment of 
illegal immigrants increases, it exerts an upward pressure on the minimum wage.  An immigrant 
would take up a job if the wage is higher than that offered in the source country.  An increase in 
the minimum wage would decrease the number of legal workers employed.  This helps to 
determine the relationship between the enforcement budget and the number of illegal workers 
employed. The enforcement budget is determined on the basis of the behavior of workers and 
employers. On the other hand, the effect of enforcement budget depends upon the relative 
strength of the (legal) labor union or capital owners union. When the labor union is stronger, an 
increase in minimum wage raises the optimal enforcement while the reverse occurs when the 
capital owners union is stronger (Epstein & Heizler, 2007). 
Accommodating further complication such as heterogeneous labor markets and growth in 
the presence of illegal migration Palivos and Chong (2010) show that illegal immigration 
increases average consumption levels of the economy and promotes skill acquisition among the 
natives.  Further, it raises asset holdings of the skilled workers, but may also lead to unequal 
wealth distribution in the steady state as well as during the transition to a high illegal immigrant 
economy. It is possible that the transfer made from the accumulated penalty applicable to illegal 
immigrants (or employers) falls short of the loss endured by domestic unskilled workers.  This 
leaves the wealth distribution even more skewed. 
These and other arguments against illegal immigration often lead to persecution mania 
and misuse of the legal procedures aimed at reducing trafficking.  This drives a considerably 
large section towards criminal activities and promotes growth of the shadow economies.  On the 
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other hand, the larger shadow economies prevailing in Asia, Latin America and Africa keep 
creating opportunities for illegal immigration.  Epstein and Weiss (2000) had suggested that 
illegal migrants might be considered for eventual amnesty to bring them back into the 
mainstream and thereby reduce additional costs incurred due to illegal „activities‟ and 
deterioration of law and order situations.  When one factors in the costs also borne by 
immigrants who choose to migrate illegally due to various reasons other than terrorism or similar 
intentions, the overall costs of illegal immigration becomes quite high.  Chau (2001) argued that 
the constraint of offering amnesty to every illegal intruder works as a credible commitment on 
the part of the country to apprehend and deport illegal immigrants once they have entered the 
labor force.  Section 3 deals with an analytical case where illegal immigration results from profit-
seeking illegal activities by agents.  It also brings up a set of complex interactions between 
migrant agents, local employers, source country issues and therefore the role of public policies. 
 
3. A Model with Smuggling and Trafficking of Illegal Workers 
“Sonia was invited to come to the United States by family friends and told that she could 
work for them as a housekeeper, and they would pay her $100.00 a week. Sonia was provided 
with fraudulent documents and departed for the United States with her new employer. She knew 
that this was illegal, but she needed the money, and was willing to take the risk. Was Sonia 
smuggled or trafficked? Sonia was smuggled into the United States. She left willingly with full 
knowledge that she was entering the United States illegally.  
Upon arriving in the United States, Sonia was kept in isolation, she was given a place to sleep in 
the basement and told not to speak to anyone or she would be turned over to the Immigration 
Service. Sonia was never paid for her work and felt that she had no one to turn to for help. Was 
Sonia smuggled or trafficked? At this point Sonia was restricted from leaving the house, 
threatened with deportation if she attempted to talk to anyone, and forced into involuntary 
servitude. Sonia is a victim of trafficking.” 
 
(Excerpts from Fact Sheet, The Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center at the U.S. 
Department of State, Washington DC, January 1, 2005; italics added) 
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The excerpts clearly suggest that trafficking in person is not one-dimensional. There is a fine line 
between smuggling and trafficking and that statistically it may be quite difficult to isolate the 
two.  In fact, what global data sets capture is essentially accounts of trafficked individuals who 
have been identified by public monitoring authorities and the information entered into official 
databases such as the European Central Aliens Register (US equivalent of this being the Central 
Index).  Table 1 displays the top 10 destinations where trafficked migrants have been located in 
recent times.   
Table 1  Top 10 countries of destination where victims were trafficked in 2011 
Destination Country Numbers 
Russian Federation 837 
Haiti 658 
Yemen 552 
Thailand 449 
Kazakhstan 265 
Afghanistan 170 
Indonesia 148 
Poland 122 
Egypt  103 
Turkey 101 
Source: IOM trafficking case data.5 
According to UNODC statistics, there has been a rising trend in the number of victims of 
trafficking identified globally during 2003 to 2006.  71 countries feature in the list where the 
authorities have been able to identify the victims recording a rise in numbers from 11706 in 2003 
to 14909 in 2006 (UNODC, 2009). In addition, the profiles of victims were documented and 
aggregated in 61 countries for the year 2006.  It was observed that 66% of the victims were 
women, 13% were girls, 12% were men and 9% were boys (UNODC, 2009). Drbohlav et al 
                                                     
5
 This, however, includes cases of internal trafficking also. 
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(2013) provide similar evidence on age profile of smuggled workers from Czech Republic.  
The latest report (2012) of the U.S. State Department on the trafficking in persons 
provides further insights regarding prosecutions, victim identification and convictions of 
traffickers from across the world. A cross-country assessment of the current scenario (based on 
estimates only, owing to lack of uniformity in national reporting structures) of trafficking in 
persons is provided in Table 2.  This in fact has direct relations with the United Nations 3P, 
namely, Prosecution, Protection and Prevention aimed at monitoring and containing trafficking 
in human beings.  Of late, the demand side aspects of smuggling and trafficking have gained 
some importance in the policy forum globally.  From South Asian perspective, however, the 
situation is quite grim. Table A.1 in Appendix 1 offers an index compiled from Cho, Dreher and 
Neumayer (2011) to report the status of this policy implementation for South Asian counties.  It 
shows that between the year 2000 and 2009, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, 
all have regularly prosecuted cases of trafficking and therefore score high on this count (on a 
scale of 1 to 5, meaning worst to best).  However, except for a few years, protection offered to 
victims or potential victims and prevention in terms of concrete policy measures have been quite 
lackluster.  Overall, therefore, the index for 3P is less than 3 for major South Asian countries, 
suggesting that there is room for substantial improvement (for detailed discussion on Asian 
migration patterns, see Abella, 2003).  There should be little doubt that preventing smuggling 
and trafficking of workers and lowering the level of economic cost and exploitation associated 
with it require a better understanding of how the policies might work in a complex maze of 
conflicting interests.             
In section 3 we offer an analytical discussion in this context, where the „second best‟ 
policy of creating disincentives for employers of illegal workers, for agents who become 
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traffickers and the individual workers who consider migrating illegally, is explored.  Related 
discussion is also available in Wheaton, Schauer and Galli (2010), which considers the market 
for traffickers as a monopolistically competitive one and analyze decisions made by potential 
migrants, employers of trafficked workers and social conditions that influence choice of 
trafficking by individuals.  A number of other contributions are also available in the International 
Migration (2010).     
 
Table 2  Region-wise Description of Identification, Prosecution and Conviction 
REGION YEAR PROSECUTIONS CONVICTIONS VICTIMS IDENTIFIED 
South and Central 
Asia 
2005 1,041 406   
2006 629 275   
2007 824(162) 298(33)   
2008 644(7) 342(7)   
2009 1989(56) 1450(10) 3510 
2010 1460(196) 1068(11) 4357 
2011 974(24) 829(11) 3907 
Africa 
2005 194 58   
2006 170 51   
2007 123(28) 63(26) 5 
2008 109(18) 90(20) 7799 
2009 325(47) 117(30) 10861 
2010 272(168) 163(113) 9626 
2011 257(99) 218(116) 10094 
East Asia & Pacific 
2005 2580 2347   
2006 1321 763   
2007 1047(7) 651(7)   
2008 1083(106) 643(35) 3374 
2009 357(113) 256(72) 5238 
2010 427(53) 177(9) 2597 
2011 1581(55) 1213(55) 5357 
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Table 2   Region-wise Description of Identification, Prosecution and Conviction (contd.) 
REGION YEAR PROSECUTIONS CONVICTIONS VICTIMS IDENTIFIED 
Europe 
2005 2521 1792   
2006 2950 1821   
2007 2820(111) 1941 (80)   
2008 2808(83) 1721 (16) 8981 
2009 2208(160) 1733 (149) 14650 
2010 2803(47) 1850 (38) 8548 
2011 3162(271) 1601 (81) 10185 
Western Hemisphere 
2005 170 59   
2006 443 63   
2007 426(1) 113(1)   
2008 448(42) 161(24) 6609 
2009 647(47) 553(66) 9020 
2010 732(80) 293(65) 6681 
2011 1023(42) 318(52) 9836 
Near East 
2005 112 104   
2006 295 187   
2007 415(181) 361(179)   
2008 120(56) 26(2) 688 
2009 80(9) 57(8) 1011 
2010 323(63) 68(10) 1304 
2011 209(17) 60(5) 1831 
Source: Department of State of United States of America, 2012. 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are those of labor trafficking prosecutions and convictions. 
 
To provide an analytical model on how various players interact in this market, let us 
consider a large illegal system where migrant smugglers, traffickers, local employers, and 
potential migrants, all respond to a policy choice made in the destination country.  However, 
before we proceed further on this, let us distinguish between trafficking and smuggling of 
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workers. Trafficking in Persons means “the recruitment; transportation; transfer; harboring or 
receipt of persons; by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion; of abduction; of 
fraud; of deception; of abuse of power or position of vulnerability or of giving or receiving 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person; for 
the purpose of exploitation”. On the other hand, the Smuggling of Migrants Protocol 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime defines 
the smuggling of migrants as the “procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the 
person is not a national or a permanent resident” (Article 3, Smuggling of Migrants Protocol, 
UNODC). 
Given this distinction we assume that smugglers and traffickers function as intermediate 
agents and their distribution is endogenous.  The government‟s objective function in the context 
of illegal immigration represents that of legal unskilled workers in the recipient country.6  
Workers pay an optimal tax according to this objective function for financing inland monitoring, 
at a given level of border enforcement (see further, Singer and Massey, 1997; Hanson et al., 
1999; Bandopadhyay, 2006).  Smugglers and traffickers are distinguished in terms of the 
exploitative rent they extract from illegal immigrants.  
Existing studies on trafficking and exploitation emanate mainly from legal, political and 
sociological documents (McCreight, 2006; Granville, 2004; Kyle and Koslowski, 2001; Abella, 
2000; IOM, 2000; Bales, 1999; etc.), and only recently have motivated economic analysis.  
Tamura (2010) shows that migrant smugglers differ in exploitative powers.  Based on the 
                                                     
6
 Skilled workers often vote against illegal immigration since it affects general conditions of living, increases crime 
and dependence on transfer payments go up.  However, their jobs are not directly threatened by it.  Presently, we 
leave out unemployment concerns of skilled workers.  Further, the government‟s objective function may directly 
include concern for illegal immigrants.  We show that the use of tax and unemployment benefit is a means to tackle 
illegal immigration even if the objective function does not explicitly include such arguments.         
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definitions of smugglers (organization that provides illegal border crossing services) and 
traffickers (organization that provides illegal border crossing services but exploits its clients after 
smuggling, UN 2000a, b), it determines endogenous distribution of smugglers and traffickers.  
Policy choices include border enforcement and high penalty for smugglers/traffickers.  The 
critical policy implications are that border enforcement reduces smuggling activity whereas, 
improved inland monitoring only might induce non-smugglers to take up smuggling.   
We use a similar source-destination analytical structure involving migration (also see, 
Woodland and Yoshida, 2006), for isolating smugglers from traffickers.  Instead of beginning 
with the usual policies adopted for curbing illegal immigration, we consider a standard tax-
unemployment benefit approach.  Not surprisingly, empirical evidence connecting illegal 
immigration to tax and unemployment benefit is unavailable.  The utility function of an unskilled 
native or legal immigrant is our basic premise.  We assume that it represents the social utility 
function as far as illegal immigration is concerned.7  Choice of an optimal tax required to fund 
inland monitoring against illegal workers (given an exogenous level of unemployment benefit 
declared by the government) determines the level of penalty that should be imposed on local 
employers and traffickers. Note that, both local employers and traffickers hire illegal workers, 
but there are subtle differences.  The local employer is either informed or not informed about the 
resident status of the worker – unless racial profiling is a dominant characteristic of such 
equilibrium – but the trafficker is certainly aware of it.  Now, the determination of optimal tax 
borne by the legal workers and the levy of penalty on employers of illegal workers together 
should determine the market-clearing wage for illegal workers.  Using these, one obtains the 
payoffs of traffickers and smugglers.  A migrant smuggler or „coyote‟ only aids in border 
crossing services and leaves the illegal migrant to find support on his own (usually in local 
                                                     
7
 Indeed, it may explicitly include concerns for illegal immigrants but this is currently bypassed.    
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farms). Traffickers, as already defined, control the activities of smuggled individuals, keep them 
in captivity and extract rents above the fee for border crossing. Acting as a smuggler exposes the 
agent to border control only, whereas a trafficker faces internal interdiction in addition to border 
control. If successful, the additional risk pays off as higher rent extracted from the trafficked 
migrant used as forced unpaid labor. At the point where the returns from the act of smuggling 
and trafficking are identical, an agent is indifferent between the two. Those who command 
greater power of rent extraction end up being traffickers and others distributed with rent 
extracting power lower than the critical level shall become smugglers.  As a second best policy, 
it should help to reduce the number of traffickers in this system from the demand side. 
On the supply side of the model the prospective immigrant from the developing country 
is asymmetrically informed about true identity and exploitative power of smugglers and 
traffickers (the excerpt refers to this characteristic).  They make decisions on whether or not to 
migrate depending on expected share of smugglers and traffickers.  The expectation is an 
important criterion for determining expected income of a potential illegal migrant in the foreign 
country.      
Given this intuitive set-up, we consider a policy. Assume an exogenous increase in the 
rate of unemployment benefit. As the government finances inland monitoring via resources 
generated from penalty (with a positive probability perpetrators are captured, and otherwise), a 
rise in committed unemployment benefit may only be covered by a higher penalty imposed, 
given the tax revenue already collected. This, in turn must lower illegal wage.  Since the 
employers of illegal workers now face higher penalty, they transfer the burden to the illegal 
workers in terms of lower wage. A lower wage should dissuade illegal migrants and is also 
expected to lower profits of both smugglers and traffickers due to scale effect.  However, agents 
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who command a high exploitative power shall remain in business and the rest will either turn to 
smuggling or go out of business.  With a lower wage and a higher possibility of matching up 
with traffickers, lowers expected foreign income and it should desist inclinations to migrate 
illegally.  Thus, it is possible to lower exploitation from illegal migration with a standard labor 
market policy usually in practice in most destination countries.    
In poor countries, the prospect of illegal migration often comes at a very high cost, 
including sale of land and other assets in order to finance illegal border crossing.  Lower foreign 
expected income compared to the high cost borne by a potential migrant is likely to create 
disincentives for migration. Of course, an exogenous rise in the unemployment benefit may not 
meet with success if looked at in isolation or from the perspective of the entire labor market.  It is 
the budget constraint of the recipient country that dictates the optimal penalty imposed, which in 
turn is directly proportional to the commitment on unemployment benefit. The higher 
unemployment benefit and the higher penalty create dual pressure on the employers of illegal 
workers.  Overall, under plausible conditions, the policy may turn out to be welfare improving at 
both ends.  
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
In the entire literature, standard deterrent policies involve the perpetrators, the direct 
victims and the government representing interests of various sections of the population – the 
capitalists, large farmers, skilled workers, etc.  Policies to control illegal immigration run into 
complicated domains of lobbying, human rights or bilateral treaties between countries.  In related 
studies, general well being of trafficked and exploited workers (Di Tommaso et al., 2009), 
creation and sustenance of illegal immigration and bonded labor (Epstein, Hillmann and Weiss, 
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1999; Genicot, 2002), specific implications of minimum wage on illegal immigration (Epstein 
and Heizler, 2007; Tapinos 1999, 2000), ban on prostitution (Akee et al. 2009), migration 
reforms and amnesty (Espstein and Weiss, 2001; Chau, 2001; Karlson and Katz, 2004) and debt 
contract and persistence of exploitation (Friebel and Guriev, 2006) have been discussed.   
This review and the brief analytical discussion need substantially more empirical 
observations to help concrete policy prescriptions.  According to Antonio Mario Costa 
(UNODC), “what counts mostly is the exploitation that takes place at several points along the 
chain as the human trafficking takes place and that is repetitive and prolonged” (BBC, 2008).  
Many UN member countries have not yet ratified the Anti-Trafficking Protocol, and not much is 
known about the scale of activities.  The efforts from academics, politicians and policy makers 
nevertheless offer a rich set of cases and policies, which eventually must lead to better outcomes 
than the second best policies discussed all through this review.        
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A.1.  Country Index and Achievements for United Nations 3P 
Code Country Year Prosecution Protection Prevention Overall 3P 
AFG Afghanistan 2000     
AFG Afghanistan 2001 1 1 1 3 
AFG Afghanistan 2002     
AFG Afghanistan 2003 2 3 3 8 
AFG Afghanistan 2004 3 3 3 9 
AFG Afghanistan 2005 3 2 3 8 
AFG Afghanistan 2006 2 2 3 7 
AFG Afghanistan 2007 2 2 2 6 
AFG Afghanistan 2008 2 2 2 6 
AFG Afghanistan 2009 2 2 3 7 
BGD Bangladesh 2000 4 3 3 10 
BGD Bangladesh 2001 4 3 3 10 
BGD Bangladesh 2002 5 3 4 12 
BGD Bangladesh 2003 5 2 3 10 
BGD Bangladesh 2004 5 4 3 12 
BGD Bangladesh 2005 5 3 4 12 
BGD Bangladesh 2006 5 3 3 11 
BGD Bangladesh 2007 5 3 3 11 
BGD Bangladesh 2008 5 3 3 11 
BGD Bangladesh 2009 5 3 3 11 
IND India 2000 4 2 2 8 
IND India 2001 4 3 3 10 
IND India 2002 4 3 3 10 
IND India 2003 5 2 3 10 
IND India 2004 5 3 4 12 
IND India 2005 4 3 2 9 
IND India 2006 5 3 2 10 
IND India 2007 4 2 2 8 
IND India 2008 4 2 3 9 
IND India 2009 4 2 3 9 
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Table A.1.  Country Index and Achievements for United Nations 3P (contd.) 
Code Country Year Prosecutio
n 
Protection Prevention Overall 3P 
NPL Nepal 2000 4 3 3 10 
NPL Nepal 2001 4 4 3 11 
NPL Nepal 2002 4 3 3 10 
NPL Nepal 2003 4 3 3 10 
NPL Nepal 2004 5 3 4 12 
NPL Nepal 2005 5 3 3 11 
NPL Nepal 2006 5 3 3 11 
NPL Nepal 2007 4 2 3 9 
NPL Nepal 2008 4 2 3 9 
NPL Nepal 2009 4 2 3 9 
PAK Pakistan 2000 2 2 1 5 
PAK Pakistan 2001 3 2 3 8 
PAK Pakistan 2002 4 2 3 9 
PAK Pakistan 2003 4 2 2 8 
PAK Pakistan 2004 5 4 4 13 
PAK Pakistan 2005 5 2 4 11 
PAK Pakistan 2006 5 2 3 10 
PAK Pakistan 2007 5 2 3 10 
PAK Pakistan 2008 4 2 2 8 
PAK Pakistan 2009 4 2 4 10 
LKA Sri Lanka 2000 4 3 3 10 
LKA Sri Lanka 2001 4 2 3 9 
LKA Sri Lanka 2002 4 3 3 10 
LKA Sri Lanka 2003 4 3 3 10 
LKA Sri Lanka 2004 4 3 3 10 
LKA Sri Lanka 2005 4 2 3 9 
LKA Sri Lanka 2006 4 2 3 9 
LKA Sri Lanka 2007 4 2 3 9 
LKA Sri Lanka 2008 4 2 3 9 
LKA Sri Lanka 2009 4 2 3 9 
Source: Cho, Seo-Young, Axel Dreher and Eric Neumayer (2011). 
Note:  Prosecution: Score 1 (worst) to Score 5 (best); Protection: Score 1 (worst) to Score 5 (best);  
Prevention: Score 1 (worst) to Score 5 (best). Overall Index: Overall 3P. Score 3 (worst) to 
Score 15 (best). 
 
 
 
